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Abstract
The 2016 Austrian presidential runoff election has been repealed
by the Austrian constitutional court. The results of the counted votes
had yielded a victory of Alexander van der Bellen by a margin of
30.863 votes as compared to the votes for Norbert Hofer. However,
the constitutional court found that 77.769 votes were “contaminated”
as there have been - at least on a formal level - violations of the legal
procedure when counting those votes. For example, the envelopes were
opened prematurely, or not all the members of the electoral board
were present during the counting etc. Hence the court considered the
scenario that the irregular counting of these votes might have caused
a reversal of the result as possible. The constitutional court sentenced
that this possibility presents a sufficient irregularity in order to order
a repetition of the entire election.
While it is, of course, possible that the irregular counting of those
77.769 votes reversed the result, we shall show that the probability,
that this indeed has happened, is ridiculously low.
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1 Introduction
On May 22, 2016 the Austrians voted in a runoff election between Norbert
Hofer (candidate 1) and Alexander van der Bellen (candidate 2). The result
after counting the votes was 49.7 : 50.3 in favor of van der Bellen. For the
precise data we refer to [1].
The party supporting the candidate Norbert Hofer subsequently appealed
to the Austrian constitutional court, claiming irregularities in the procedure
of counting the mail votes.
Here are the details. In Austria there are two ways of casting one’s vote.
Either by showing up personally at the poll site and delivering the vote into
the ballot box (ballot voting), or by sending the vote by mail during a well-
defined period preceding the voting day (mail voting).
The allegation of Hofer’s party was that in some districts the counting of
the mail votes violated the procedure stipulated by the law. For example, the
letters of the outer envelopes containing these votes (in an inner envelope)
should not be opened before 9:00 a.m. of the subsequent Monday, May 23.
The reason is that the electoral board for the mail votes for districts only is
called on duty for this time. By opening these letters prematurely these votes
became invalid was argued by the alleging party. Several other accusations
were made, involving different degrees of severity [8].
The constitutional court carefully investigated these accusations and con-
cluded that in 11 of the 117 voting districts there have indeed happened vio-
lations of the law during the procedure of counting the mail votes. The court
sentenced that in total there were 77.769 mail votes counted in an irregular
way. The central argument of the court in favor of ordering a repetition of
the election was that there was the possibility that manipulations on such
a number of votes might have led to a reversal of the result. After all, the
margin was only 30.863 votes.
On the other hand, the constitutional court states explicitly in its findings
that there was no evidence that there actually have been any manipulations
of the votes. What has been proved were several violations of the legally
prescribed procedure of counting the votes.
2 The Analysis
Our goal is to obtain a quantitative analysis of the probability that there
was in reality a victory of Norbert Hofer and was only turned afterwards
– in whatever way – into a victory of Alexander van der Bellen because of
wrong-counting the mail votes in the incriminated 11 districts.
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To do so, we first compare the results in the N = 106 = 117− 11 “green”
or “uncontaminated” districts where the court did not find violations of the
legal procedures, with the M = 11 “red” or “contaminated” districts districts
where the court found violations of these procedures.
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Figure 1: Mail and ballot vote percentages - official results
Each “green” district corresponds to a green dot: on the x-axis we plot
the percentage of votes for candidate 1 (Norbert Hofer) among the ballot
votes, and on the y-axis the percentage of the votes for candidate 1 among
the votes by mail. The picture clearly indicates a linear relation between
these two ratios. One also sees that the slope of the regression line is smaller
than 1 which does not come as a surprise. Among the voters of Norbert
Hofer the propensity to use the possibility of voting by mail is smaller than
among the voters of Alexander van der Bellen. We can also observe that the
intercept of the regression line essentially vanishes, i.e. the regression line
essentially passes through the origin.
While the green dots correspond to the “uncontaminated” districts, the
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red dots in Figure 1 correspond to the 11 “contaminated” ones. Glancing at
Figure 1 one cannot see any alarming behavior of the red dots.
The above Figure 1 corresponds to the counted votes. In the subsequent
analysis we shall only accept the green dots as valid data. As regards the red
dots, we only take their x-coordinate as granted: recall that the x-coordinate
corresponds to the percentage of ballot votes in favor of candidate 1. As
regards the y-coordinates of the red dots, it is precisely our point to analyze
whether the true votes gave different results than the counted votes in a
degree which could have resulted in a reversal of the election result.
As an illustration, Figure 2 below indicates a scenario for the true votes
which would have yielded a victory for candidate 1 (by a margin of 1 vote).
To obtain Figure 2, we have assigned – hypothetically – 15.432 (half the
missing 30.863 votes, rounded up) proportionally to the 11 “contaminated”
districts, and subsequently recalculated the corresponding percentages. This
procedure implements a scenario where that many votes have wrongly been
counted for candidate 2 instead of candidate 1. For more detailed informa-
tion we refer to the web site of the first named author [2] (http://www.
wahlanalyse.com/WahlkartenDifferenzenVfGh.html).
It is evident that a scenario as in diagram 2 does not look very likely to
have happened in reality. This diagram only has an illustrative character for
our purposes in order to visualize the absurdity of such a scenario. It will not
play any role in the subsequent analysis. In particular, we shall not assume
a certain given assignment of the missing 30.863 votes to the 11 red districts.
We shall only be interested in their total sum. Speaking mathematically, we
shall eventually calculate the probability distribution of the total number
of true mail votes in the incriminated districts, conditionally on the given
results of the “green” districts, and calculate the probability of the event
that they would have resulted in a victory of candidate 1.
To analyze the probability that the true votes by mail in the red districts
would have yielded a victory for candidate 1, we apply a weighted linear
regression model to the green dots in diagram 1.
In fact, since the calculations become easier to write and to program, we
use a regression model on the number of votes instead of the percentages,
which is mathematically equivalent. Since the expected variation of the votes
depends on the total number of votes in the respective districts, the model
exhibits heteroskedascity, and we have to use a weighted regression.
Regression models include prediction intervals for observations with known
values for the independent variable(s) and known standard deviations (com-
pared to standard deviations of completely known cases). Using these proce-
dures and assuming that the mail vote results in the contaminated districts
follow the model of the uncontaminated districts, we can then compute the
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Figure 2: Mail and ballot vote percentages - modified results
distribution of the sum of the expected votes in the contaminated 11 dis-
tricts (which, under the present model assumptions, follows a rescaled t-
distribution).
Using the distribution of this random variable, we can then calculate the
probability that the true votes would have resulted in an election of candidate
1. As we shall see below, the numerical value equals p = 1.322065 · 10−10.
Actually, it turns out that the sentence of the constitutional court may
also lead to a slightly different calculation. Apart from the 11 “contaminated”
districts it identified 3 more “dubious” districts where things are not so clear.
We refer to [8] for the details. Although the sentence of the court did not take
into account these districts, one might argue that – possibly – also in these
districts the counting of the mail votes was not reliable. Mathematically
speaking, this leads to the consideration of M = 14 “red” and N = 117 -14
= 103 “green” districts. The calculations then are identical to the above
considered case and lead to a numerical value of p = 5.151422 · 10−8.
5
3 The Model
We consider N = 117−11 = 106 voting districts with a total of tn valid votes
for n = 1, . . . , N. In district n, there were vn votes counted for candidate 1
and v¯n votes for candidate 2, so that vn + v¯n = tn.
The votes tn split into bn many ballot votes and mn many mail votes
which again are divided into vb,n(resp. vm,n) many votes for candidate 1 and
v¯b,n = bn − vb,n (resp. v¯m,n = mn − vm,n) many votes for candidate 2.
Our objects of interest are the vote numbers
vb,n and vm,n, n = 1, . . . , N.
These numbers denote the votes for candidate 1 among the ballot and
mail votes respectively. As indicated by the diagrams above, a linear relation
between these quantities is justified as model assumption. To make the plots
easier to understand, we used percentages instead of votes there.
While the numbers (vb,n)
N
n=1 are considered as given data the numbers
(vm,n)
N
n=1 are considered as realizations of the following random variables:
Vm,n = k vb,n + n, n = 1, . . . , N (1)
Here k is an unknown deterministic number while (n)
N
n=1 are indepen-
dent centered Gaussian random variables. Their variance is σ2mn, for some
(unknown) deterministic number σ > 0.
Variances of votes for parties being proportional to the number of total
votes is a standard model assumption in statistical voting analysis procedures
(see [3], [5], [6], [7], and [4] ).
We are thus facing a heteroskedastic, linear regression model.
Applying standard regression theory, we obtain the estimators kˆ, σˆ which
we consider as random variables. In particular, the estimator kˆ follows a
(rescaled) t-distribution whose parameters can be explicitly calculated for
the given data.
We next consider M = 11 many “contaminated” districts, disjoint from
the N “ uncontaminated” districts.
Assuming that the results Vm,j j = 1, . . . ,Mm also follow model 1, they
can be considered as random variables
Vm,j = k vb,j + j, j = 1, . . . ,M.
As we do not know the true value of k we have to consider the estimated
variable
Vˆm,j = kˆvb,j + j, j = 1, . . . ,M.
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The new noise variables (j)
M
j=1 are such that ((n)
N
n=1, (j)
M
j=1) are indepen-
dent. The variance of the j again is given by σ
2mj.
Finally we consider the sum
Vˆ =
M∑
j=1
Vˆm,j.
Vˆ is the random variable modeling the total mail votes for candidate 1 in
the M “contaminated” districts.
Denoting by vb =
∑m
j=1 vb,j the total number of ballot votes of candidate
1 in the M “contaminated” districts, and by m =
∑M
j=1mj the total number
of mail votes in these districts, we may write Vˆ as
Vˆ = kˆ vb + 
where  is a centered Gaussian variable with variance σ2m.
A standard tool of regression theory allows us to compute a prediction
interval for Vˆ .
If σ2 were known, Vˆ = kˆvb +  were normally distributed with mean kˆv
and variance σ2
(
v2b∑N
n=1
v2
b,n
mn
+m
)
Applying this fact we use the regression model estimate for σˆ as substitute
for the unknown constant σ. Using this, the random variable
Vˆ − kˆvb
σˆ
√
v2b∑N
n=1
v2
b,n
mn
+m
follows a t-distribution with 105 degrees of freedom.
We compare this random variable with the critical number V˜ which would
be necessary for candidate 1 in order to reverse the result. Finally we compute
P[V ≥ V˜ ]
which can be computed explicitly and yields the desired result.
4 Confidence intervals for prediction
We use results for the standard heteroskedastic linear model
y = Xβ + 
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with covariance matrix (cov)() = σ2W for a given positive definite matrix
W.
In this model, the best linear unbiased estimator for β is
βˆ = (X ′W−1X)−1X ′W−1y
The covariance of this estimator is
cov(βˆ) = (X ′W−1X)−1X ′W−1cov(y)((X ′W−1X)−1X ′W−1)′
= (X ′W−1X)−1X ′W−1σ2WW−1X(X ′W−1X)−1
= σ2(X ′W−1X)−1
In our case, X is the Nx1-matrix (vb,n)
N
n=1 and W is the diagonal matrix
diag((mn)
N
n=1). The parameter β in our case is the scalar k and its estimator
is kˆ, and cov(βˆ) becomes var(kˆ)
Therefore X ′W−1X =
∑N
n=1 vb,n
1
mn
vb,n =
∑N
n=1
v2b,n
mn
and
var(kˆ) = σ2
1∑N
n=1
v2b,n
mn
We want to compute the distribution of Vˆ = kˆvb +  with E() = 0 and
var() = σ2m.
We have
E(kˆvb + ) = E(kˆvb) + E() = kvb
var(kˆvb + ) = var(kˆvb) + var() = σ
2
 v2b∑N
n=1
v2b,n
mn
+m

Since σ2 is unknown, we have to replace it by the estimator σˆ2 and then
Vˆ−kˆvb
σˆ
√√√√ v2b∑N
n=1
v2
b,n
mn
+m
follows a t-distribution with N − 1 degrees of freedom. From
that confidence intervals for Vˆ can be derived easily.
5 The Results
All the data and the code for performing our analysis can be found at
https://github.com/neuwirthe/AustrianPresidentialElection.
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Candidate 1 had 34479 votes in the contaminated districts, and he would
need additional 15432 votes, so that in total he needs V˜ = 34479 + 15432 =
49911 votes to overturn the result.
Using the R code from the URL above to compute the probability of a
result overturning the result in favor of Hofer, we get the value
p = 1.322065 · 10−10.
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